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Summary: Results of two field experiments which were designed to identify possible ethnic discrimination on a German
internet auction platform are discussed. A first set of results was produced by a secondary analysis of an earlier experi-
ment. The second experiment then tested whether costly signals could help to overcome problems of trust between
buyers and sellers in online markets. The evidence is rather mixed with respect to ethnic discrimination, and it does not
support the signaling hypothesis.
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Zusammenfassung: Die Ergebnisse von zwei Feldexperimenten zur Untersuchung einer mçglichen ethnischen Diskrimi-
nierung auf einer deutschen Internet-Auktions-Plattform werden diskutiert. Hierfür wird zunächst ein früheres Expe-
riment einer Sekundäranalyse unterzogen. Das zweite Experiment untersucht darüberhinaus, ob kostspielige Signale
helfen kçnnen, Vertrauensprobleme zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern auf Online-Märkten zu lçsen. Die Befunde sind
hinsichtlich ethnischer Diskriminierung uneindeutig und stützen die „Signaling“-Hypothese nicht.
Schlagworte: Diskriminierung; Kostspielige Signale; Vertrauen; Online-Markt; Experimentelle Soziologie; Feldexperi-
ment.
1. Introduction
The unequal treatment of people or groups based
on their ethnicity or race is regarded as ethnic or ra-
cial discrimination. Economists have conceptua-
lized discrimination as taste-based and informa-
tion-based. Becker (1957) was the first to suggest
that people might have a taste (i.e., preference) for
interacting with one kind of people but not another.
In his theoretical framework, Becker incorporates
such a taste as a non-monetary part of a person’s
utility function which, if negative, is called discri-
mination and, if positive, is called nepotism (i.e.,
positive discrimination). Becker notes, however,
that even if such a taste did not exist, we would ob-
serve unequal treatment of people belonging to dif-
ferent social groups because they either objectively
differ with respect to a relevant characteristic or are
erroneously believed to do so. Not before the early
1970s did economists come up with a formalization
of the latter idea. Virtually at the same time, Arrow
(1973) and Phelps (1972) developed a model of sta-
tistical discrimination showing that in the labor
market, under incomplete information, differential
judgments by employers can lead to wage differen-
tials of employees from different social groups. For
example, given employers’ beliefs that qualified
workers are less likely to be found among blacks
than among whites and given an employer incurs a
cost from determining a potential employee’s actual
qualification, skin color serves as “cheap” proxy
for qualification. Thus, skin color becomes the cha-
racteristic upon which an employer decides whe-
ther or not to hire a particular person at a particu-
lar wage. Allport (1954) notes that if a person’s
belief is based on wrong information and would be
revised in the light of new evidence, this person ma-
kes an error of prejudgment. A prejudgment beco-
mes a prejudice, however, if a person does not revi-
se his or her belief given new information. Arrow
(1973) suggests cognitive dissonance as an explana-
tion for people being prejudiced (i.e., having incor-
rect and sticky beliefs). According to the theory of
cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957), people tend
to bring their beliefs into accord with their behavi-
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or. Hence, someone who has engaged in discrimina-
tory behavior is reluctant to adjust his or her beliefs
in light of new evidence as this would imply admis-
sion of wrongdoing. Theories of social identity
(Tajfel 1981) and self-categorization (Turner et al.
1987), on the other hand, posit that the degree of
one’s identification with a social group determines
whether a social interaction is perceived as inter-
personal or inter-group. In the latter case, behavior
is led by in-group norms rather than by a deliberate
appraisal of the interaction at hand. Moreover, it
has been suggested that out-group discrimination is
a means to demonstrate one’s loyalty and trustwor-
thiness to in-group members (Posner 2000) and to
gain intra-group social status (McAdams 1995).
Thus, discrimination can be based on taste, wrong
information, prejudice, and on social norms.
Empirical studies have repeatedly identified more
or less subtle forms of ethnic and racial discrimina-
tion in job, housing, credit, and consumer markets
(for a review, see Pager & Shepherd 2008). The
most common approach has been to investigate
outcome inequalities between social groups by
means of statistical analysis. After controlling for
all factors explaining between-group differences in,
for instance, wages or loan conditions, the main ef-
fect of ethnicity or race on outcomes can be attribu-
ted to discrimination. However, objections that
such evidence could be spurious because some un-
measured causes have not been accounted for in the
model are hard to accommodate. Moreover, the
fact that ethnicity and race are invariant within the
same person limits the possibilities for causal infe-
rence. Ethnicity and race can be varied experimen-
tally, though. In field experiments, researchers send
pairs of applications on behalf of two bogus candi-
dates seemingly applying for the same job or pro-
perty. The two applications differ in one characte-
ristic from which a naive employer or letting agent,
respectively, could derive the candidate’s ethnicity
or race. Observed differences in response rates are
ascribed to discrimination. Although limited in ge-
neralizability, the validity of results from such field
experiments is particularly high. There is no self-
selection of participants into experimental condi-
tions; it is actual and not stated behavior that is
being measured and participants are not aware of
the fact that they are taking part in a scientific stu-
dy about discrimination (for reviews, see Riach &
Rich 2002; Pager 2007).2 Klink & Wagner (1999)
conducted 14 field experiments in which they va-
ried the ethnicity of a confederate or fictitious per-
son in diverse social interactions such as housing
searches, help requests, restaurant reservations, or
hitchhiking. Their results give evidence of ethnic
discrimination against the Turkish minority in Ger-
many. In a recent field experiment, Doleac & Stein
(2010) sold iPods (i. e., portable multimedia
players) through local online classified advertise-
ments throughout the United States. They varied
the skin color (black vs. white) of the hand holding
the product on an advertisement photograph and
find considerably lower sales for seemingly black
sellers than for white sellers. Further evidence of
buyers being reluctant to include their real names
in the e-mail correspondence or to agree on mail
delivery and long-distance payment when dealing
with seemingly black sellers suggests that black sel-
lers are perceived to be less trustworthy than white
sellers.
In online markets, trust problems arise from the
fact that buyers have to send the money before the
seller ships the merchandise. Unlike the local online
markets where Doleac & Stein (2010) conducted
their experiment, many online markets implement
a feedback forum which allows buyers and sellers
to rate one another after a transaction (Kollock
1999). Sellers receive positive and negative ratings,
which determine their reputation, and buyers take
sellers’ reputation into account when deciding to
bid for an auctioned product. It can be shown theo-
retically that sellers entering the market have to in-
vest in building their reputation by allowing a dis-
count, and therefore, sellers’ reputations must be
correlated with selling prices (Shapiro 1983;
Ockenfels 2003). The empirical evidence largely
confirms that positive (negative) ratings positively
(negatively) influence sales and selling prices (for
reviews, see Bajari & Hortacsu 2004; Resnick et al.
2006). However, an interesting question is whether
sellers entering the online market with an empty
feedback record can signal their trustworthiness by
other means. The theoretical argument is based on
signaling theory, most prominently introduced into
the social sciences by Spence (1973) and expanded
on trust research by Voss (1998), Bacharach &
Gambetta (2001), Raub (2004) and Diekmann &
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2 Field experiments investigating market discrimination
are also known as audit studies. In general, field experi-
ments, as opposed to laboratory experiments, denote ex-
perimental investigations in a natural environment. The
term nonreactive is used, if, in addition, subjects do not
know that they participate in a field experiment (e.g.,
Diekmann 2007: 630). For nonreactive studies on ethnic
discrimination using non-experimental designs see, for
instance, Kalter (1999) and Levitt (2004).
Przepiorka (2010). The formal argument derived
from game theoretic models is that only sellers with
a long-term interest to stay in the market have an
incentive to behave cooperatively, and therefore af-
ford to invest in costly signals. For example, produ-
cers of experience goods advertise their products
even though this advertising cannot add valuable
information prior to purchase. Nelson (1974) ar-
gues that consumers choosing products that have
been advertised could be confident of the product’s
quality since only repeated sales would compensate
the producer for the initial expenses on advertise-
ment. Hence, advertisement can be a costly signal
that allows buyers to distinguish between sellers of
high and low quality products (Diekmann & Prze-
piorka 2010).
The present study investigates whether members of
the Turkish minority in Germany are discriminated
against in an online market. Given the previous evi-
dence, I expect to find more sold items and higher
prices attained by German sellers than by Turkish
sellers. In online markets, social interactions are
less likely to be observed by one’s peers. Therefore,
ethnic discrimination, if present, will less likely be
induced by social norms. However, potential buyers
could perceive Turkish sellers as less trustworthy
than German sellers and discriminate against them
based on these beliefs. Lower perceived trustwor-
thiness clearly implies information-based discrimi-
nation. However, since buyers’ actual beliefs about
Turkish sellers’ trustworthiness in online markets is
unobserved, information-based and taste-based
discrimination cannot be distinguished. The study
also investigates whether market entrants can cre-
dibly signal their trustworthiness by an initial costly
investment. According to the theoretical considera-
tions outlined in the previous paragraph, I expect
both German and Turkish sellers displaying a costly
signal to be bought from with higher probability
and to attain higher prices than sellers not display-
ing a costly signal. Moreover, if potential buyers
discriminate against Turkish sellers because they
believe Turkish sellers to be less trustworthy, Tur-
kish sellers displaying the costly signal should be
more successful and attain higher prices than Tur-
kish sellers who do not display it. If, however,
buyers discriminate against Turkish sellers based on
taste, Turkish sellers should perform on a similar le-
vel, irrespective of whether or not they send a costly
signal. These hypotheses are tested empirically in a
field experiment described in the third section. Sho-
hat & Musch (2003) conducted a similar field ex-
periment to investigate discrimination of the Tur-
kish minority in Germany. As I arrive at different
conclusions from the secondary analysis of their
data the next section reproduces their findings and
the new evidence. The concluding section discusses
the findings.
2. Experiment 1: Discrimination in an online
market – a secondary analysis
Shohat & Musch (2003) conducted a field experi-
ment in order to test whether members of the Tur-
kish minority in Germany are subject to discrimina-
tion in the German online market eBay.de. In their
experiment, one seller was given a Turkish alias
(mehmet.orgum) and another seller was given a
German alias (michael.ottersbach). In a two weeks
period, both sellers sold the same sat of 30 different
DVDs. The Turkish seller auctioned the first subset
of 15 DVDs in the first week and the other 15
DVDs in the second week. The German seller did it
the other way round. In other words, 30 different
movie titles were sold each one by a seemingly Tur-
kish and a German seller, but in different succession
(cf. also Shohat 2001). Contrary to their hypothe-
sis, Shohat & Musch (2003) found no statistically
significant difference between German and Turkish
sellers in the average number of page views, the
average number of bidders, or the average selling
price. From these findings the authors conclude
that, unlike in other studies, they could find no
direct evidence for ethnic discrimination in the on-
line market under study.3 In what follows, I first ar-
gue that the heterogeneity induced by the different
movie titles and the fact that the two different sub-
sets of movies were auctioned by the Turkish and
the German seller in two different weeks have to be
accounted for in the data analysis. Then I show that
buyers do discriminate between German and Tur-
kish sellers – but only if there is a lack of alternative
offers by other sellers.
Shohat (2001: 100) provides the raw data from the
experiment. These data allow replicating the fin-
dings reported in Shohat & Musch (2003). The re-
sults section in Shohat & Musch (2003) reports
t-statistics from mean-comparison tests for the out-
come variables mentioned in the previous para-
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3 Their exploratory data analysis, however, revealed that
German sellers received their highest bid significantly ear-
lier than Turkish sellers. This time difference would indi-
cate that “buyers turn to auctions of Turkish sellers only
when the same item cannot be bought from a German sel-
ler at a favorable price“ (Shohat & Musch 2003). Unfor-
tunately, the authors did not test this conjecture.
graph. In laboratory experiments in which subjects
are randomized into experimental groups, differen-
ces in the means of the outcome variable can be
fully attributed to the treatment (or stimulus). In
the field experiment under discussion randomiza-
tion of subjects (i. e., potential buyers in the eBay
market) was not possible. Buyers always have the
possibility to choose sellers contingent on their cha-
racteristics. Self-selection into experimental treat-
ments, however, is not the only problem many field
experiments must cope with. As time goes by, espe-
cially in such a dynamic environment like an online
market, the context, and with it unobserved con-
founding factors, can change considerably. If infor-
mation about subjects’ characteristics or the con-
text is not available, it is difficult to compensate for
the lack of randomization and time-induced hetero-
geneity in a statistical model. The data provided in
Shohat (2001: 100) though allow accounting for
some potentially confounding factors.
Table 1 contains coefficient estimates from OLS re-
gressions models each with 29 dummy variables ac-
counting for movie title fixed effects (e.g., Gujarati
2003). The dependent variable in models M1 and
M2 is the selling price in DM (x–=29.57, x~=31,
sd=7.05) and in model M3 the number of bidders
(x–=7.68, x~=7.5, sd=2.39). The estimation of mo-
del M1 shows that movie titles and week of experi-
ment account for nearly the complete variance in
the dependent variable (adj.R2=0.989). Moreover,
it confirms the finding by Shohat & Musch (2003)
that buyers do not pay more or less depending on
the sellers’ alleged ethnicity. The latter, however,
should be questioned because buyers can choose
the seller they like. If, for instance, self-selection de-
pends on nepotism such that German buyers prefer
buying from German sellers and non-German
buyers find offers by Turkish sellers more attracti-
ve, the actual treatment effect could be blurred by
this unobserved heterogeneity. The data, however,
do not allow controlling buyer characteristics in a
statistical model. The estimates in model M2, on
the other hand, support the conjecture that unob-
served heterogeneity is an issue. The model con-
tains two additional explanatory variables accoun-
ting for the number of alternative offers from other
sellers, i. e., seller competition (x–=4.88, x~=3,
sd=5.05), and its interaction with the focal seller’s
ethnicity.4 While seller competition does not have a
significant main effect, the main effect of the focal
seller’s ethnicity shows that given alternative offers
by other sellers are lacking, buyers pay 2.7 DM
more if the seller is German than if the seller is Tur-
kish. The significant interaction effect indicates that
the ethnicity main effect decreases as the number of
alternative offers increases. Model M3 confirms
that the more other sellers offer the same item, the
less potential buyers are attracted by the German
seller. Hence, the actual difference in what buyers
pay for an offer from a German and a Turkish seller
is more pronounced if alternative offers are lacking
and the bidding competition is high.
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Table 1 Fixed effects regression models
M1 M2 M3
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
German seller 0.60 0.84 2.74* 1.03 0.93 0.72
Week 2 2.00* 0.84 2.34* 0.78 1.07+ 0.54
Competition –0.48 0.31 0.21 0.22
German 6 Compet. –0.34* 0.15 –0.24* 0.10
Retail price 0.11* 0.03
Movie title dummies, F-statistic 58.78* 44.27* 2.47*
N 60 60 60
Adj. R2 0.989 0.991 0.940
Notes: Fixed effects regression models with selling price (in DM) as the dependent variable in the first two models and number of bidders
in model three. All models account for movie title fixed effects (+ p<0.10, * p<0.05). The analysis is based on data from Shohat (2001:
100).
4 The number of alternative offers from other sellers is a
variable provided in Shohat (2001: 100). The variable
measures the number of alternative offers of the same
movie title one day before the auction of the DVD offered
in the experiment ended.
3. Experiment 2: Discrimination and costly
signaling
Similar to Shohat & Musch (2003), I implemented
a field experiment on eBay.de which tried to meet
some of the shortcomings of the previous study. I
established 44 online seller accounts which varied
in two characteristics. Firstly, half of the accounts
were opened with aliases comprising a Turkish first
name (e.g., Ali, Ercan, Murat, Ozkan, etc.) and the
other half with aliases comprising a German first
name (e.g., Axel, Christian, Helmut, Steffen, etc.).5
Secondly, half of the sellers had a verified identity.
Obtaining a verified identity is costly in terms of
time and money. A seller can verify his or her iden-
tity by filling out a form that includes the appli-
cant’s real name, address, and passport or identity
card number, and bringing the form to the munici-
pal administration for notarization at a cost of 15
Euro. About ten days after eBay receives the form,
the verified identity icon appears next to the seller’s
alias on the seller’s profile page as well as on every
item page. I auctioned 84 identical 1 GB digital me-
mory cards which are widely used in small digital
devices like cameras, mobile phones, and handheld
computers. The criteria for the choice of the market
for SD memory cards were the homogeneity, the
low complexity, and the convenience of handling of
the merchandise. The retail price of such a memory
card was, at that time, about 20 Euro. The cards
were posted at an initial price of 1.99 plus shipping
and handling charges of around 9.90 Euro. The ti-
tle, description, and picture of the item were identi-
cal across the 84 posts. However, to increase the
appearance of different sellers, the order of words
in the title and sentences in the description was
sometimes altered. Figure 1 shows an offer that
was posted on the market in the field experiment.
The seller has a German alias (christian0935), zero
ratings, and the verified identity icon appears next
to this information (see „Angaben zum Verkäufer“
on the right hand side of Figure 1).
I implemented a randomized block design for the
experiment. One block consisted of a pair of items
which were put online at about the same time. The
two items of a pair differed in at least one characte-
ristic – either in the alias (Turkish vs. German), in
the identity (verified vs. not verified), or in both.
Table 2 summarizes the experimental conditions.
The randomized block design is especially suited
for experiments in which one expects more variabi-
lity between than within homogeneous subgroups.
In order to account for the between-pair variability,
I estimated fixed effects regression models. Another
advantage of this approach is that within-pair cons-
tant unobservables cancel out in the estimation pro-
cess. In addition, as the matched pairs are randomi-
zed over time model misspecification due to
unobserved heterogeneity becomes less of an issue.
After a short pretest, the experiment started on Oc-
tober 30 and lasted until December 21, 2006. One
pair of items was put online every day. In order to
eliminate potential sources of reactivity, I started
the item pairs at different times in the evening. Un-
fortunately, the marketplace restricted new sellers,
allowing offers to be posted only at quarters of an
hour. Since I wanted to avoid the two items of a
pair to start at exactly the same instant, one item
started 15 minutes after its pair. Another restriction
was that an offer had to last for at least three days.
Because the time restriction made it impossible to
offer all item pairs consecutively during the desired
time frame, three pairs of items were offered during
overlapping periods. Figure 2 illustrates the descri-
bed experimental design and the scheduling. The
four letters A, B, C, and D denote the four treat-
ment conditions (see Table 2).
Despite the efforts at camouflaging the auctions,
eBay closed down some of the seller accounts ele-
ven days into the experiment, suspecting some sort
of fraud. The problem was resolved through direct
communication with eBay and the experiment
could be continued with a delay of three days (see
Figure 2).6 I had to cope with a further restriction
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5 At the time the experiment was conducted, eBay.de allow-
ed every person to open up to six user accounts with diffe-
rent aliases. In order to open a user account on eBay.de, a
valid credit card or direct debit account was required. For
this reason, I asked several friends and colleagues to pro-
vide me with their credentials. The alias is one’s user name
on eBay. It can be freely chosen, but must not offend com-
mon decency and has to be unique in the whole market
platform. People usually choose a fancy name or their first
name followed by a number as their alias. Aliases as such
are not legally binding, but the person registered under a
certain alias is responsible for the activities of his or her
online alter ego. I chose aliases comprising either a Ger-
man or Turkish first name because I wanted potential
buyers to believe that they are trading with a German or
Turkish seller, respectively.
6 eBay closed down six accounts which had all been open-
ed with the credentials of one person. There was no appa-
rent reason for this, and I have never learned why eBay
closed exactly these accounts and all other accounts re-
mained unaffected. Note that during this study I never en-
gaged in illegal practices, deceived eBay users or violated
other rules established by eBay. The experiment was con-
ducted within the constraints determined by the platform
which resulted from the fact that buyers could leave
feedback after a completed transaction. It took
about ten days from the moment an offer ended
until the buyer received the item and could be
expected to leave feedback. A seller account with
an entry in the feedback history would clearly vio-
late the experimental conditions. Therefore, it was
possible to use the same seller account at most three
times in a row. While an item was active in the mar-
ket, I often received e-mails from potential buyers.
The e-mails I received were either inquiries about
shipping conditions or suggestions to make the deal
outside of the market place. I did not reply to e-mails
until an offer had ended. Once an offer had ended
and had received at least one bid, the highest bidder
received my bank details and was asked to transfer
the money within the next few days. Not until this
point potential buyers had the possibility to learn
who the real person was with whom they were tra-
ding. As soon as the money arrived on my bank
account, I shipped the merchandize to the address I
had been given by the buyer. Neither the bidders
nor the buyers ever learned that they had partici-
pated in a scientific experiment.
Table 3 contains descriptive statistics of the number
of sales and mean selling prices (incl. shipping
costs). 77 of the 84 items were sold at an average
price of 13.86 Euro. The differences between mean
prices across experimental conditions are rather
small and statistically insignificant (Wilcoxon sig-
ned-rank test for within pair differences in selling
price: ID verified vs. not verified, n=23, z=1.521,
p=0.128; Alias German vs. Turkish, n=22, z=
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Fig. 1 Item offered in the field experiment
Table 2 Number of items posted by treatment
Seller’s Alias
Verified ID German Turkish Total
yes
A B
42
21 21
no
C D
42
21 21
Total 42 42 84
provider and all buyers received the product they had paid
for.
0.86, p=0.39). The same is true for the number of
sales (Fisher’s exact test: ID verified vs. not verified,
p=0.352; Alias German vs. Turkish, p=0.669). In
both cases H0 (d=0) was tested against the two-
sided alternative.
Table 4 shows regression estimates of selling price
on the main treatment and control variables. Each
model contains 41 dummy variables absorbing the
between-pair variability. Model 1 estimates treat-
ment main effects and a two-way interaction. The
coefficient estimate for the verified identity has the
expected direction and is statistically significant at
the 10% level. It turns out, however, that it makes
a difference whether an item was posted first or se-
cond in a pair. Model 2 includes a dummy variable
accounting for this fact and the coefficient estimate
is positive and significantly different from zero.
The inclusion of this factor changes the magnitude
of the other coefficient estimates suggesting that
treatments were not perfectly randomized across
the sequence within item pairs.
Out of the 84 items auctioned in the experiment, 7
items were not sold. Thus, potential buyers’ wil-
lingness to pay for these items is censored at a star-
ting bid of approximately 12 Euro and the actual
values remain unobserved. However, using a trun-
cated sample (i. e., sold items only) or the censored
values in the data analysis yields inconsistent coeffi-
cient estimates (Long 1997: 201–203). This prob-
lem can be tackled by the use of other estimation
techniques. The estimation of Model 3 in Table 4 is
based on a censored normal regression (Greene
2002: 764–768). The coefficient estimates do not
deviate much from the estimates in Model 2, but
are statistically significant. The results can be inter-
preted as follows. Having a verified identity or a
German alias increases selling prices by 1.09 or
0.87 Euro on average, respectively. The negative in-
teraction effect suggests, however, that having both
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Fig. 2 Design and time schedule of field experiment
Table 3 Summary statistics by treatment
Seller’s Alias
Verified ID German Turkish Total
20 (1) 20 (1) 40 (2)
yes 13.71 14.14 13.92
(0.36) (0.66) (0.37)
18 (3) 19 (2) 37 (5)
no 14.33 13.30 13.80
(0.53) (0.37) (0.33)
38 (4) 39 (3) 77 (7)
Total 14.00 13.74 13.86
(0.31) (0.39) (0.25)
Notes: Number of items sold (not sold), mean selling prices
(incl. shipping costs in Euro), and standard deviations of the mean
in parentheses.
does not further increase a seller’s trustworthiness.
In other words, identity verification pays off for a
Turkish seller, but being German, a verified ID does
not further increase a seller’s profits. The interac-
tion effect is only significant at the 10% level,
though.
There are several reasons for why, in this case, the
estimates from the censored normal regression
model (M3) may be misleading. Firstly, unlike in
OLS, estimates of the censored normal regression
are inconsistent if the assumptions of homoscedas-
ticity and normally distributed errors do not hold
(Greene 2002: 768–773). Moreover, the model esti-
mation is based on assumptions which are only
known to hold for large samples. Given the sample
size of 84 cases, these assumptions are likely to be
violated. Secondly, while the mere numbers in
Table 3 tend to suggest lower sales if sellers’ identi-
ty is unverified, they seem not to correspond to the
ethnicity main effect and the interaction effect ob-
tained in Model 3. Finally, the number of censored
cases is relatively small. Usually, a small number of
censored cases will decrease the bias of the OLS
coefficients estimated on the truncated sample. Sin-
ce only 8.3% of the cases are censored, the bias in
Model 2 will be rather small. Therefore, I consider
the coefficients estimated in Model 2 as the more
reliable ones and will base my conclusions on the
results obtained in Model 2 only.
4. Discussion and conclusions
The paper reports results from two field experi-
ments designed to identify possible ethnic discrimi-
nation on a German internet auction platform. The
second experiment also tests whether costly signals
can help to overcome trust problems between
buyers and sellers in such markets. The first experi-
ment was conducted by Shohat & Musch (2003);
the secondary analysis of their data reveals that
their conclusion of no evidence for ethnic discrimi-
nation may be incomplete. Controlling for possibly
confounding factors in a multiple linear regression
model shows that ethnicity indeed has a statistically
significant and substantial effect on selling price. In
particular, if the number of similar offers by other
sellers is small, seemingly German sellers attain
higher selling prices than Turkish sellers. This indi-
cates that ethnic discrimination becomes apparent
when stakes rise due to a lack of competition. Ho-
wever, the data provided in Shohat (2001: 100) do
not allow controlling for every potential source of
bias. That is to say, the secondary analysis present-
ed here could likewise suffer from omitted-variable
bias. It shows, however, that if a randomization of
subjects in experimental treatments is not possible,
one should either be able to control for potentially
confounding factors in a statistical model, or devise
a research design that better copes with possible
confounds. The second field experiment replicated
the first, albeit with a more elaborate design. Forty-
two pairs of items which differed in at least one sel-
ler characteristic (either ethnicity, verified identity,
or both) were put online at different occasions over
a period of 50 days. Thus, experimental treatments
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Tabelle 4 Fixed effects regression models of selling price
M1 M2 M3
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
Verified ID 1.25+ 0.64 0.94 0.61 1.09* 0.41
German seller 0.66 0.64 0.57 0.59 0.87* 0.40
Verified  German –1.08 0.87 –0.86 0.81 –1.02+ 0.56
First in pair 0.87* 0.35 0.77* 0.24
Const. 14.72* 1.67 14.81* 1.54 11.22* 0.81
Pair dummies, F(41,38) statistic 2.79* 3.31* 6.67*
N 77 77 84
Adj./pseudo R2 0.50 0.57 0.35
Notes: OLS and censored normal regression models with selling price (incl. shipping cost, in Euro) as the dependent variable. All models
account for item pair fixed effects. Models 1 and 2 are estimated on the truncated sample. Model 3 is a censored normal regression
(+ p < 0.10, * < 0.05).
were randomized over time and unobservable con-
founding factors were held constant within item-
pairs. Results of this second experiment provided
no conclusive evidence either for ethnic discrimina-
tion or for the signaling hypothesis.
While it is good news, of course, to find no evi-
dence for ethnic discrimination on this online mar-
ket, there are several reasons to believe that under
slightly different conditions we might have obser-
ved both discrimination and a signaling effect.
Firstly, in the second experiment, potential buyers
also had the possibility to choose a seller based on
his observable characteristics. Hence, discrimina-
tion against German sellers and favoritism of Tur-
kish sellers could have canceled out discrimination
against Turkish sellers. However, the buyers’ sur-
names are predominantly German (not reported)
and therefore, such a compensating effect appears
rather unlikely. Secondly, for technical reasons the
merchandise had to be shipped from Switzerland.
The information about the item location is display-
ed on every offer page (see „Artikelstandort“ in
Figure 1). The results of the second experiment
could be explained, if one assumed that potential
buyers were predominantly concerned with the fact
that the seller shipped from Switzerland, comple-
tely neglecting the other seller characteristics.
However, it is difficult to think of a reason why this
should be the case. Finally, at the time of the second
experiment approximately 200,000 offers of simi-
lar memory cards were posted on eBay.de by about
3,500 different sellers. The fact that only 49% of
these offers resulted in a sale suggests an oversupply
of the merchandize and consequently low selling
prices (cf. Przepiorka 2010). In fact, the average
selling price was 13.86 Euro, significantly below
the retail price of about 20 Euro. Hence, if poten-
tial losses are not very high, buyers might consider
information provided about the seller less carefully.
I would expect a replication of this study with a
more expensive product to give evidence for both
ethnic discrimination and a signaling effect of the
verified identity. In this case indeed, it would be in-
teresting to see whether trust-enhancing costly sig-
nals are necessary and sufficient to compensate the
negative effect of ethnic discrimination. If so, this
would indicate that ethnic discrimination in online
markets is information-based rather than taste-
based.
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